

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 785

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 6634

AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

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LONDON FOR FUNSETH; DEPARTMENT FOR S/PRS PASS NSC FOR MR.
SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE FOR NESSEN; USIA FOR IPS/PE;
DEPARTMENT: PLEASE PASS TO OTHER INFO ADDRESSEES AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, OCON, OVIP

SUBJ: SECRETARY KISSINTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING NATO
MINISTERIAL MEETING, DECEMBER 10, 1976

FOLLOWING IS THE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY OF STATE
HENRY A. KISSINGER'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT NATO HEADQUARTERS
IN BRUSSELS, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1976, CONCLUDING THE 58TH
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.
BEGIN TEXT:

THE SECRETARY: I'LL GO RIGHT TO YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DON'T YOU THINK THAT THE PURCHASE
BY THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT OF 15 PERCENT OF THE MAJOR
ITALIAN INDUSTRY, FIAT, COULD INFLUENCE IN SOME WAYS
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ITALY WHICH IS STILL A NATO
COUNTRY?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IN THE WANING DAYS OF MY PUBLIC
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CAREER I DARE NOT TAKE ON BOTH THE ITALIAN AND LIBYAN
PUBLIC OPINION.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DURING THE COURSE OF THE TALKS, DID THE SITUATION IN SOUTHER AFRICA COME UP AND IF SO WERE ANY PROPOSALS MADE FOR FURTHER ACTION BY YOU OR THE UNITED STATES?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA CAME UP IN THE SENSE THAT I GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION AS I SAW IT AND MR. CROSSLAND MADE AN ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF MY REMARKS. WE SUBSTANTIALLY AGREED IN OUR ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION. AS YOU KNOW I AM GOING TO MEET MR. CROSSLAND AND HIS ASSOCIATES THIS AFTERNOON IN LONDON AND AGAIN TOMORROW. NO RECOMMENDATIONS WERE MADE BY NATO WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHERN AFRICA BUT THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION AS WE SAW IT.

Q. IN WHICH AREAS DID YOU AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY NOT AGREE IN YOUR ANALYSIS ON RHODESIA?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I WOULD SAY THAT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND I AGREE COMPLETELY IN OUR ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE ROLE THAT BRITAIN IS PLAYING UNDER GREAT DIFFICULTIES AT GENEVA. IT IS A COMPLICATED NEGOTIATION WHICH PROCEEDS THROUGH A SERIES OF CRISES AND DRAMATIC HEADLINES BUT IN WHICH WE BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS REMAINS POSSIBLE. THE UNITED STATES, AS GREAT BRITAIN, SUPPORTS MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA AND SUPPORTS A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THE AFRICAN COMPONENT IS IN THE MAJORITY. NOW HOW TO WORK OUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS TO EACH OTHER IS THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT WHATEVER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU CAN STILL PLAY ANY ROLE AT ALL IN HELPING BREAK THE DEADLOCK BY MEETING MR. NKOMO IN LONDON OR ANY OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAVE NO PLAN TO MEET MR. NKOMO...
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I WILL NOT MEET MR. NKOMO BECAUSE I KNOW THAT SOME OF THE EXECUTIVES HERE WILL MISINTERPRET THE WORD THAT I HAVE NO PLANS. I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN REMAINING IN CONTACT BOTH WITH THE PARTIES IN GENEVA AND WITH THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS, WHO HAVE SUCH AN IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY. WE ARE INDEED IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH ALL OF THESE PARTIES AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE BLACK MAJORITY UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH MINORITY RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, HOW DO YOU THINK YOUR POLICY REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST, OR LET US SAY AMERICAN POLICY REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST, WILL CONTINUE AFTER YOU, AND WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. CAN YOU GIVE US A GENERAL ASSESSMENT ABOUT THE SITUATION AS YOU SEE IT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, I'M SURE YOU KNOW THAT I AM NOT THE SPOKESMAN THAT HAS BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, SO I WOULD NOT WANT TO MAKE PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THEIR POLICIES. MR. VANCE IS AN OLD FRIEND OF MINE. I BELIEVE THAT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES CAN NEVER BE BASED ON THE PERSONAL PREFERENCES OF INDIVIDUALS AND TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WE ATTEMPTED TO ANALYZE THE BASIC REALITIES AND THE BASIC INTERESTS AND PURPOSES OF THE UNITED STATES. IN THAT SENSE IF OUR CONCLUSIONS WERE SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT, I WOULD BELIEVE THAT A NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD FOLLOW A SIMILAR COURSE. THERE MIGHT BE DIFFERENCES IN TACTICS, DIFFERENCES IN PERSONALITIES.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 6635

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I BELIEVE THE MAIN COMMITMENT TOWARDS A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IS DICTATED BY AMERICAN INTEREST AND BY WORLD INTERESTS AND FINALLY BY THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: MY ASSESSMENT, WHICH I HAVE BEEN MAKING FOR MONTHS, BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER OUR ELECTION IS

THAT THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS THAT MAKE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE BETTER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN PERHAPS DECADES. I BELIEVE THAT ALL OF THE PARTIES HAVE COME TO A REALIZATION THAT THERE IS NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THEIR CONFLICT AND THAT SOME NEGOTIATED PEACE MUST BE SOUGHT. AN ENDLESS CONFLICT WILL HAVE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PEOPLES INVOLVED AND PROFOUND GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES AND, THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THAT THE PARTIES ARE NOW MORE READY AND THE CONDITIONS ARE NOW MORE RIPE FOR A SIGNIFICANT EFFORT TOWARDS PEACE THAN HAS BEEN THE CASE IN A LONG TIME.

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Q. MR. SECRETARY, SHOULD THE PLO BE REPRESENTED AT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE UNITED STATES HAS STATED REPEATEDLY ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PLO WHICH IS THAT UNTIL THE PLO ACCEPTS THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE RESOLUTIONS ON WHICH THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED--THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ADDRESS THIS SORT OF A QUESTION.

Q. IS THERE ANY PROSPECT OF THAT ACCEPTANCE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THAT IS FOR THE PLO TO ANSWER.

Q. BUT I TAKE IT THAT YOU SAY UNLESS THEY DO THEY WILL NOT BE AT GENEVA, SO FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: UNTIL JANUARY 20TH, ANYWAY. (LAUGHTER)

Q. THAT'S ALL I COULD ASK.

Q. (IN FRENCH) DO YOU AGREE WITH THE IDEA THAT YOUR PERIOD OF SERVICE FOR THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS SERVED TO REINFORCE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND AT THE SAME TIME TO DESTROY (SIC) EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I BELIEVE THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS BEEN GREATLY STRENGTHENED IN RECENT YEARS. I BELIEVE THAT THE SYSTEM OF CONSULTATION THAT NOW EXISTS WITHIN NATO AND BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF NATO, EVEN OUTSIDE THE NATO FRAMEWORK, IS INTIMATE AND SUBSTANTIAL AND IT REFLECTS THE REALIZATION BY ALL OF THE COUNTRIES THAT WE ARE UNITED NOT ONLY FOR SECURITY BUT AS THE REPOSITORIES OF FREEDOM IN THE WORLD TODAY. AND I BELIEVE THAT NATO IN ITS POLITICAL ASPECT IS STRONGER THAN IT HAS BEEN AND THAT THE POLITICAL UNITY OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAS BEEN GREATLY

ENHANCED.

Q. AND EUROPE?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: AND THE UNITY OF EUROPE? THE UNITED STATES IS STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF THE UNITY OF EUROPE. I BELIEVE ALSO THAT IN THE LAST EIGHT YEARS SIGNIFICANT CONCRETE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS THE UNITY OF EUROPE IN BOTH ITS ECONOMIC AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, IN ITS POLITICAL ASPECTS AND I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, LOOKING BACK WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER TO BE YOUR MOST SATISFYING ACHIEVEMENTS AND YOUR GREATEST DISAPPOINTMENTS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, I HAVE TOLD THE NAT COUNCIL THAT IT'S TOO EARLY TO WRITE OBITUARIES, AND HAVING SUCH A DISTINGUISHED GROUP OF PEOPLE HERE THAT HAVE BEEN ANALYZING MY DRAWBACKS AND ACHIEVEMENTS, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE FORMER, I WOULD NOT WANT TO INTERFERE WITH YOUR WORK (LAUGHTER).

Q. MR. SECRETARY, COULD I PURSUE THIS QUESTION ALONG THESE LINES? YOU HAVE BEEN ASKED MANY TIMES SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN HERE FOR YOU TO VOLUNTEER SOME OF YOUR THOUGHTS AND YOU HAVE HANDLED THIS USUALLY WITH HUMOR AND WITH A JOKE ASIDE. I WONDER, SIR, IF AT THIS TIME IN YOUR FAREWELL NEWS CONFERENCE HERE IN EUROPE, WHETHER YOU WOULD TAKE A MOMENT AND SHARE WITH US SOME OF YOUR THOUGHTS AT THE PRESENT TIME, AS YOU PREPARE TO STEP DOWN.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I EXPRESSED SOME OF THESE THOUGHTS, IN ANSWER TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION. I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE ULTIMATE TEST OF WHATEVER AN AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE OR PRESIDENT DOES WITH RESPECT TO ANY OTHER PART OF THE WORLD WILL BE THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE UNITY AND VITALITY AND STRENGTH OF THE FREE PEOPLES, ESPECIALLY THE PEOPLES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. SECURITY BY ITSELF IS NOT ENOUGH. WE HAVE TO ASK SECURITY FOR WHAT AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE? WE THEREFORE OWE IT TO OUR PEOPLES, AS WE SEEK SECURITY, TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE ALSO SEEKING PEACE; AND WE ALSO OWE IT TO OUR PEOPLES THAT, AS WE DEVELOP OUR COHESION, WE DEFINE THE PURPOSE THAT THIS COHESION IS TO SERVE IN

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TERMS OF A BETTER WORLD. THIS I CONSIDER THE PERMANENT TASK OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, AND HISTORY WILL HAVE TO JUDGE HOW ANY ONE ADMINISTRATION CARRIED IT OUT. BUT I AM POSITIVE THAT ANY NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE SAME AGENDA.

Q. (IN FRENCH) MR. SECRETARY, UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS DO YOU THINK THAT ONE DAY WE CAN CONTROL THE CURRENT ARMAMENTS RACE AND ENTER INTO A REAL ORGANIZATION FOR PEACE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE THE CHARACTERISTIC THAT WILL MAKE THE TRADITIONAL REFLECTIONS ABOUT MILITARY POWER SUBSTANTIALLY IRRELEVANT AND

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THAT THEY IMPOSE ON ALL STATESMEN AN OBLIGATION TO BRING THE ARMAMENTS RACE UNDER CONTROL. WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN THE CONTROL OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS AND I BELIEVE THAT A FURTHER AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS IS WITHIN REACH. THERE ARE OTHER DISCUSSIONS GOING ON ON THE LIMITATION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO CONDUCT OUR POLICY BETWEEN TWO EXTREMES. ON THE ONE HAND, NOT TO DISARM OURSELVES EITHER BY UNILATERAL ACTIONS OR BY THEORIES THAT PRODUCE A PARALYSIS OF WILL, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND NOT TO BELIEVE THAT THE MERE ACCUMULATION OF ARMAMENTS IS IN ITSELF A POLICY. THEREFORE THERE IS A NECESSITY TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ARMS SOBERLY, REALISTICALLY, BUT WITH GREAT DEDICATION.

THE CABLE EVER SINCE, SO I CANNOT VOUCH FOR ITS ACCURACY.

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IN THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR CAPACITY TO GUARD CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT DOCUMENTS APPEAR OUT OF CONTEXT. I WOULD NOT THINK THAT THIS PARTICULAR DOCUMENT SHOULD DO ANY SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES -- INDEED IT WAS ONE OF THE ORGANIZERS OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE --WE BELIEVE THAT AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN ONLY BE BUILT ON THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DEVELOPED AND THE DEVELOPING NATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE DEVELOPED NATIONS HAVE A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO PUT FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVE, CONCRETE PROPOSALS AND THAT THE DEVELOPING NATIONS HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PROCEED IN A SPIRIT OF DISCUSSION RATHER THAN A SPIRIT OF CONFRONTATION. IT IS TRUE THAT WE DID NOT THINK THAT THIS WAS THE BEST MOMENT FOR THE CONFERENCE. AN OUTGOING ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE IN THE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT POSITION OF HAVING TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY ANOTHER ADMINISTRATION AND, THEREFORE, IT DID NOT SEEM TO US TO BE THE RIGHT MOMENT TO HAVE A CONFERENCE BECAUSE EITHER WE WOULD CONFINE OURSELVES TO THE PEIOR FOR WHICH WE HAD RESPONSIBILITY AND WOULD THEREFORE DISAPPOINT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, OR WE WOULD COMMIT A NEW ADMINISTRATION TO A PROGRAM WHICH IT HAD NO PART IN SHAPING. THERE WERE OTHER REASONS THAT OTHER COUNTRIES HAD FOR THE POSTPONEMENT, BUT AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, THIS WAS THE REASON WHY WE FAVORED A POSTPONEMENT, WHATEVER EXTRACTS FROM OBTUSE DOCUMENTS MAY APPEAR IN NEWSPAPERS. BUT I'LL TRACK DOWN THAT DOCUMENT IF IT EXISTS.

Q. (IN FRNECH) IF SPAIN JOINS NATO HAVE YOU STUDIED WHAT MIGHT BE THE NEXT RESPONSE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THIS DISEQUILIBRIUM?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THEY MIGHT ASK ALBANIA TO JOIN THE WARSAW PACT (LAUGHTER). THE UNITED STATES HAS FAVORED THE PARTICIPATION OF SPAIN IN NATO AND THE POLITICAL PROGRESS THAT IS BEING MADE IN SPAIN, WHICH WE WELCOME, IN OUR VIEW SHOULD SPEED THE DAY WHEN THAT SITUATION IS POSSIBLE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WILLBRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE MILITARY BALANCE BECAUSE WE HAVE ALREADY A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH SPAIN AND CLEARLY IT IS NOT A PART OF ANY OFFENSIVE INTENTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION,
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SO WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS A MATTER THAT SHOULD NOT AFFECT SOVIET DISPOSITIONS.

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Q. MR. SECRETARY, ONE OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT IS
FREQUENTLY CITED BETWEEN THE KIND OF FOREIGN POLICY THAT
YOU HAVE CONDUCTED AND THE TYPE OF FOREIGN POLICY THAT
PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER MAY CONDUCT HAS TO DO WITH
MORALITY. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER
MAY BE MAKING A MISTAKE BY GIVING TOO MUCH EMPHASIS TO
THE SUBJECT OF MORALITY, OR DO YOU FEEL IN FACT THAT YOU
HAVE CONDUCTED A FOREIGN POLICY WITH FULL REGARD TO THAT?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I MADE A RATHER EXTENSIVE SPEECH
ON THAT SUBJECT BEFORE OUR ELECTION. I BELIEVE THAT
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IS
NOT A SIMPLE ONE. I AGREE WITH WHAT MY SUCCESSOR SAID
AT A PRESS CONFERENCE -- THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE
STRONG MORAL CONVICTIONS, BUT IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO
BRING INTO RELATIONSHIP THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION
WITH MORAL PURPOSES. IT IS THE ESSENCE OF MORAL PURPOSES
THAT THEY APPEAR ABSOLUTE. IT IS THE ESSENCE OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT ANY INDIVIDUAL STEP CAN ONLY BE PARTIAL. IT
IS THE ESSENCE OF MORALITY THAT IT IS ASSERTED TO BE
UNIVERSAL. IT IS THE ESSENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY TO TAKE

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INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF OTHERS THAT MAY ALSO BE CLAIMED

TO BE UNIVERSAL. NOW, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT WHAT I NOW
ASSERT ABOUT MY CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY WILL BE DECISIVE.
I BELIEVE THAT A FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT MORAL CONVICTIONS
LACKS A SENSE OF DIRECTION AND A SENSE OF PURPOSE, BUT
WHAT BALANCE IS STRUCK IN EACH ADMINISTRATION IS VERY
HARD TO PREDICT AND VERY DIFFICULT TO FORETELL FROM
ABSTRACT STATEMENTS.

Q. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS HAVE APPEARED MORE PROMINANTLY
IN YOUR DELIBERATIONS THIS WEEK THAN THEY HAVE AT SOME
PREVIOUS ALLIANCE MEETINGS. COULD YOU GIVE US YOUR
THOUGHTS ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THERE IS A DANGER THAT
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SITUATION MIGHT DETERIORATE TO THE
POINT WHERE ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN
THE ALLIANCE WAS BROUGHT INTO SOME QUESTION--TO WHAT
EXTENT THAT PROSPECT IS BROUGHT NEARER BY AN SUBSTANTIAL
INCREASE IN OIL PRICES?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE UNITED STATES IS STRONGLY
OPPOSED TO ANY SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN OIL PRICES,
PRECISELY BECAUSE IT BELIEVES THAT THE IMPACT OF THOSE
ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNFORTUNATE AND
WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH IN THE LONG RUN, OR EVEN
IN THE MEDIUM RUN, WOULD AFFECT THE VERY COUNTRIES THAT
ARE NOW RAISING OR THINKING OF RAISING THE OIL PRICES.
I BELIEVE THAT THE LAST THREE OR FOUR YEARS HAVE MADE
CLEAR THAT ONE CAN NO LONGER COMPARTMENTALIZE FOREIGN
POLICY INTO SECURITY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS.
THE SOCIAL COHESION OF ALL OUR SOCIETIES, OUR CAPACITY
TO ACT WITH CONVICTION INTERNATIONALLY, DEPENDS ON ROW-
ING AND VITAL ECONOMIES AND THESE ECONOMIES IN TURN DEPEND
ON THE MUTUAL SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH OTHER
OF THE FREE COUNTRIES. THIS IS WHY THESE ECONOMIC SUMMITS
HAVE BEEN BOTH SYMBOLICALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY IMPORTANT
AND WHY I BELIEVE AND HOPE THAT THEY WILL REMAIN A
FEATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND WHY ONE CAN NO
LONGER SEPARATE THE SECURITY CONCERNS.

Q. AN EASY QUESTION FOR YOU, SIR. WHAT KIND OF ADVICE,
AS WE SIT HERE AT NATO TODAY AND YOU PREPARE TO STEP DOWN,
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DO YOU HAVE FOR CYRUS VANCE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER (LAUGHTER). WE WILL TAKE ONE MORE
QUESTION AFTER THIS ONE BUT SINCE YOU WILL ALL STAMPEDE
OUT TO REPORT THE MONUMENTAL NEWS THAT YOU HAVE BEEN
IMPARTED HERE, I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK
YOU FOR THE RELATIVE COURTESY WITH WHICH I HAVE ALWAYS
BEEN TREATED HERE AND THE FAIRNESS WHICH YOU HAVE SHOWN.

AS FAR AS ADVICE FOR CYRUS VANCE IS CONCERNED, I WISH HIM WELL. I HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT HE IS EXTREMELY WELL QUALIFIED FOR HIS POSITION. I HAVE ALREADY MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM ALL COMMUNICATIONS THAT COME TO ME. HE WILL BE GIVEN A SCHEDULE OF ALL MY ACTIVITIES IN WASHINGTON, AND HE IS FREE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THEM AND AT ANY MEETINGS THAT I HAVE. I WILL BE SPENDING MOST OF THE DAY WITH HIM NEXT WEDNESDAY, AND WE WILL BE MEETING REGULARLY AND FREQUENTLY AFTER THAT. I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME, HOWEVER, TO GIVE PUBLIC ADVICE TO MY SUCCESSOR BEFORE I HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. BUT I DO WANT TO SAY THAT HE DESERVES THE CONFIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE; THAT HE DESERVES THE CONFIDENCE OF ALL FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH THE DIRECTION OF AMERICAN POLICY.

Q. WOULD YOU LIKE TO SAY SOMETHING SIR ABOUT THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE LARGE COMMERCIAL DEBTS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ACQUIRING TOWARDS THE WEST, AND THE CONTUED EXTENSION OF EASY CREDIT AND TRANSFER OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIETS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, LET ME SEPARATE THE TWO QUESTIONS. ONE, THE EXTENSION OF CREDIT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY; THE SECOND, THE FUTURE OF THE EAST-WEST TECHNOLOGY; THE SECOND, THE FUTURE OF THE EAST-WEST RELTIONS. WITH RESPECT TO THE EXTENSION OF CREDIT, I ADVOCATED LAST YEAR AT THE OECD MEETING-- AND I REPEATED IT AT THE NATO MEETING-- THAT IT IS ESENTIAL FOR THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES TODEVELOP A COMMON APPROACH AN A COMMON CONCEPT. IT MAKES NO SENSE FOR THESE COUNTRIES TO COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER ON CREDIT TERMS WITHOUT TAKING
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A LOOK AT THE OVERALL PICTURE AND THE OVERALL CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS. SO I BELIEVE ON THE TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUE THAT THIS IS AN AREA IN WHICH GREAT COHERENCE AMONG THE INDUSTRIAL DEMORACIES IS ESSENTIAL. AS FOR THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION THAT WE HAVE A DUAL RESPONSIBILITY. ONE IS TO PREVENT ANY TEMPTATION ON THE PART OF THOSE

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COUNTRIES THAT CONTINUE TO MULTIPLY THEIR ARMAMENTS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN ACHIEVE POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS BY THE USE OF ARMS AND WE THEREFORE HAVE TO SEE TO OUR SECURITY AND MAKE THE NECESSARY EFFORTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE FUTURE OF WORLD PEACE AND, INDEED, PERHAPS THE SURVIVAL OF HUMANITY DEPENDS ON WHETHER WE CAN I THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST FIND SOLUTIONS TO OUR COMMON PROBLEMS AND A CODE OF RESTRAINT, LEST WE SLIDE

AGAIN -- AS HAS HAPPENED SO OFTEN BEFORE IN HISTORY THROUGH A SERIES OF MISCALCULATIONS AND THE ACCUMULATION OF MARGINAL ADVANTAGES -- INTO A PERHAPS UNIMAGINABLE CATASTROPHE. SO WE HAVE THE TASK OF SECURITY AND THE TASK OF CONSTRUCTION OF PEACE. AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE WESTERN SOCIETIES IS WHETHER THEY CAN PURSUE BOTH POLICIES SIMILTANEOUSLY, OR WHETHER THEY WILL SLIDE ONE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

END TEXTSTRAUSZ-HUPE

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Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761290/baaabaer.tel
Line Count: 631
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: wolfsd
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 JUN 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <04 JUN 2004 by hattaycs>; APPROVED <03 AUG 2004 by wolfsd>
Review Markings:

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US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, OCON, OVIP
To: STATE
SECDEF
USIA INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
MADRID
TOKYO
Type: TE

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